Are foreign variables important for tracking U.S. inflation expectations? This paper estimates a reduced-form model which takes into account both domestic and global indicators of economic slack as well as inflationary pressures. Our main findings point towards the instability of the estimated parameters over the last four decades. In particular, global indicators appear to have played a significant role in shaping forecasters' expectations until the mid-'80s. By contrast, the U.S. monetary policy stance turns out to be relevant in the '80s and '90s. We relate this finding to the more aggressive monetary policy conduct implemented by the Fed since the end of the Volcker experiment.
1 Introduction "The challenge that lies before the Committee is to manage policy in a way that permits the economy to realize its productive potential while simultaneously maintaining firm control of inflation and inflation expectations." (Ben S When thinking of a simple model for inflation expectations in a given country, it is natural to relate such expectations to domestic factors (i.e. factors specific to that country). However, some recent contributions (Rogoff (2003) , Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) , Mumtaz and Surico (2006) , Borio and Filardo (2006) ) have stressed the role potentially played by global factors (i.e. factors regarding country-aggregates such as the G7 or the OECD) in affecting U.S. inflation. If one country's inflation is mainly driven by global forces, central bankers might have the incentive to coordinate at an international level in order to offer a global response to global shocks. Of course, given the role played by inflation expectations in influencing inflation (e.g. Woodford (2003) ), it seems of interest to try understanding to what extent global factors have influenced expected inflation. 2 1 In this paper, we concentrate on U.S. short-term inflation expectations. For contributions dealing with long-term inflation expectations in various countries, see Castelnuovo et al (2003) and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005, 2006) . 2 In the standard new-Keynesian model a la Clarida et al (1999) , realized inflation is the sufficient statistic for expected inflation, i.e. E t π t+1 = ρπ t , where ρ is the autoregressive parameter of the AR(1) process for the cost-push shock. However, such a model does not capture the well-known evidence in favor of the existence of lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Consider a model more suited for capturing the mentioned lags, i.e. a simplified version of the AD/AS model proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) : π t = απ t−1 + βy t−1 + ε t , y t = γy t−1 − ϕ(i t−1 − π t−1 ) + η t , where π is the inflation rate, y is the output gap, i is the nominal interest rate, and ε, η are white noise shocks. Then, by imposing the rational expectations assumption, one obtains E t π t+1 = φ 1 π t−1 + φ 2 y t−1 + φ 3 (i t−1 − π t−1 ) + ξ t+1 , where φ 1 ≡ α 2 , φ 2 ≡ (α + γ)β, φ 3 ≡ −βϕ, and ξ t+1 ≡ αε t + βη t . In general, the link between expected inflation and a variety of macro-variables may be interpreted as a perceived law of motion followed by the private sector under some form of learning (see e.g. Milani 2006 ). This paper aims at assessing the link existing between U.S. inflation expectations and international (i.e. global) forces at an empirical level. To do so, we estimate a simple reduced-form model for U.S. inflation expectations. As regressors, we consider both standard domestic indicators such as U.S. inflation, the U.S. output gap, different measures of inflationary pressures, and the U.S. monetary policy conduct on the one hand, and global measures of inflation and the business cycle on the other. We conduct our empirical analysis by proceeding in two steps. First, we assume absence of breaks in the estimated relationships, and we estimate fixed-coefficient models. Then, we investigate the issue of parameter stability by running rolling-window regressions as well as subsample regressions.
Several results arise. First, we find first-glance evidence in favor of the global output gap and global inflation as drivers of U.S. inflation expectations. Further checks show that these global variables add information with respect to a large variety of standard measures of internal and external pressures (e.g. unit labor costs, trade openness, liquidity, financial pressures). Interestingly enough, this full sample empirical evidence turns out not to be robust across different subsamples. In fact, rolling-window regressions reveal that the relevance of our global indicators is not stable over time, and it tends to disappear when crossing the mid-'80s. We argue that this break might be due to the aggressive monetary policy conduct implemented by the Fed at the end of the Volcker experiment. A subsample analysis confirms the significance of a measure of monetary policy stance in the last two decades, so corroborating our conjecture on the "substitution" between global and domestic forces that might have occurred in the mid '80s.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the time-series of interest and the empirical model we employ for tracking inflation expectations, and it discusses our full sample results. Section 3 analyzes the parameter instability issue, and it interprets the findings stemming from our subsample estimates. Section 4 concludes. Figure 1 compares the 1-quarter ahead inflation expectations to the (1-period ahead) realized inflation. It is immediate to see that the forecast error is quite persistent, an evidence consistent with not fully rational expectations, or with rational agents who must estimate the unknown time-varying inflation target (Erceg and Levin (2003) , Andolfatto et al (2007) ) or some key-parameters of the model-economy of interest (Orphanides and Williams (2005) ). 4 This evidence suggests the need of accounting for persistent factors -other than realized inflation -for explaining inflation expectations. 5 One natural candidate is a measure of domestic slack, i.e. the output gap. In fact, given the role played by demand pressures in shaping an economy's price level, the evolution of the domestic business cycle may be informative for forecasting inflation. Additionally, we consider the "G6 output gap", constructed by averaging the output gaps of Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom. 6 As documented by Tootell (1998), the countries belonging to the G7 have been the main trading partners of the U.S. economy after the second world war. Therefore, such a macro-aggregate is likely to provide an informative indicator of "global slack". 7 Borio and Filardo (2006) find evidence in favor 3 The Survey of Professional Forecasters, formerly conducted by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research, is currently managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In this survey, forecasters are asked to provide quarterly projections up to five quarters ahead and annual projections for the current and following year on the main macroeconomic variables. For more information, see Croushore (1993) . 4 Interestingly, some of the features of the forecast error seems to be time-varying. For instance, its volatility (measured by its standard deviation) declines from 1.74 to 0.91 when moving from the sample 1970Q1-1984Q4 to 1985Q1-2006Q3 . We will return on this subsample instability issue later.
5 This evidence corroborates the idea of considering inflation expectations a differect object with respect to realized inflation. The relationship between these two objects as suggested by a microfounded new-Keynesian framework is very tight, we stress that such relationship is less tight when ingredients such as learning or lack of credibility by monetary policy authorities (leading to indeterminacy) are taken into account. 6 We concentrate on G6 aggregates (i.e. we do not consider the U.S. output gap in building up our global indicators) to tackle multicollinearity. German data regard the sample 1991Q1-2006Q3 to remove the effect of reunification (see the Data Appendix for more details). We concentrate on the measures of the output gap provided by the OECD, which are computed on the basis of a measure of the potential output obtained by the production function approach. Our benchmark measure of the global gap is the simple average of the output gaps of the countries of interest. Crucini et al (2006) show that there is a very high correlation between the simple average of G7 countries' real GDP growth rates and the latent world factor they compute (which is a weighted average of the G7 real GDP growth rates, with weights determined according to a statistical criterion). Our results are robust to the employment of a weighted average of the output gaps of the G6 (in the next Section).
7 Notice that we do not take Mexico and China into account. As pointed out by Tootell (1998) , data on inflation and the business cycle in Mexico and China (two among the most important exporters to the U.S. in the latter part of the sample) are not very reliable. Moreover, Bernanke (2007) estimates in about 0.1 percent per year the short-term effect reduction of the overall inflation rate due to the slowing increase in prices related to Chinese imports. Evidence against a large impact from the Chinese of global measures of slack in Phillips-curve type models of inflation, so supporting the idea that the evolution of nominal prices might be driven by the world-wide business cycle.
8 Given the constantly increasing degree of openness of the U.S. economy in the last decades, the G6 output gap might have very well played a role as an indicator of future domestic inflation. As far as globalization and global inflation are concerned, Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) interpret a global dynamic factor computed with a panel of OECD countries as an "inflation attractor" in an error-correction mechanism model for domestic inflation. Mumtaz and Surico (2006) find evidence in favor of a world factor significantly accounting for the decline in the level and persistence of national inflation rates. We approximate such a global indicator of inflation with the simple average of the inflation rates in the G6.
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Modeling inflation expectations We postulate the following encompassing model for inflation expectations:
where E t π t+1 is the one quarter ahead annualized GDP inflation expectations as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 10 π t is the annualized quarterly inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, y D t is a measure of the domestic output gap, y G t is the G6 log-real GDP, and x t is a regressor taking into account other possible output gap to U.S. is also provided by Borio and Filardo (2006) . Some regressions we conducted with a measure of the Chinese business cycle (the HP-filtered Chinese log-real GDP) confirmed us that such impact is not statistically significant in the model at hand. Further discussions on this issue may be found in Ball (2006) .controls, among which G6 inflation. The wiggle above the variables indicates that such variables have been detrended prior to estimation. The motivation for this choice is threefold. First, all the variables considered in our study are non-stationary according to standard tests, and this could harm the reliability of our estimates.
11 Second, models of inflation expectations in the learning literature are often written in terms of deviations with respect to a known or perceived time-varying reference value (e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2005) ). Third, removing a long-run trend from inflation expectations augments to ability of the model to capture the determinants of the shortrun fluctuations in inflation expectations, very much like removing trend inflation from realized inflation does (Cogley and Sargent (2007)).
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Figure 2 depicts the evolution of inflation expectations, our estimated inflation target, and the "inflation expectations gap". Notice that, while being a crude measure of the U.S. inflation target, the filtered series matches quite closely the estimates of the time-varying U.S. inflation target proposed by Ireland (2006) . In fact, the average value of π 14 It is evident that the business cycle measures may be of help for tracking inflation expectations. Notably, when jointly considering the domestic and the global output gap, the former loses its significance. 15 This finding resembles the one proposed by Borio and Filardo (2006) in their study focusing on Phillips curves "augmented" with the global slack, and it seems to point towards the relevance of globalization and global indicators in tracking inflation expectations.
16 Table 2 proposes the results of our regressions in which we allow for δ 6 = 0. As additional regressor, we consider the global inflation gap f π G t as well as a more standard measure of inflationary pressures such as import price inflationîmpprπ t (annualized quarterly growth rate of the import price index). We also aim at understanding if the U.S. monetary policy stance has played any role in shaping inflation expectations. Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) , the measure of monetary policy stance that we consider is the average real interest rate gapâvgrrate, computed by considering a MA(3) transformation of the ex-post real interest rate, i.e.
. 17 A few results stand out. First, the point estimates of both expected inflation and realized inflation (both lagged) are stable across models and are highly significant. Second, our measures of external price pressures are significant. Third, the only model in which the global gap is not significant is the one in which global inflation is considered. This suggests that the global gap might actually be a proxy for the global inflation rate. In fact, when estimating a "global Phillips curve" (sample: 1970Q1-2006Q3), we obtain
14 The estimated value for the constant c is not significant in all the regressions presented in the paper. This is a side-effect of considering variables in gaps. 15 This result is robust ot the employment of the U.S. and G7 output gap measures provided by the OECD (Main Economic Indicators). The significance of the global output gap measure is present also when e y G t−2 (as opposed to e y G t−1 ) is considered in the regression. When orthogonalizing the G6 output gap with respect to the domestic one, the orthogonalized G6 output is still significant in the regression. 16 For a discussion on the robustness of Borio and Filardo (2006) 's results to variations of the global output gap and inflation expectations proxies, see Ihrig et al (2007) . 17 We also considered as additional regressors different transformations (e.g. gaps, growth rates) of the unit labor costs, a possible proxy of marginal costs as in Sbordone (2002); a measure of trade openness proposed by Romer (1993) , i.e. imports plus exports over total production; an indicator of financial stress (the S&P 500 index) as in Airaudo et al (2006) ; an indicator of global liquidity (average of the money growth rate in the G7) as in D'Agostino and Surico (2007);.an indicator of oil price inflation. Our results turned out to be robust to these controls. which highlights the possible transmission channel going from external slack to external inflation, and eventually to domestic inflation expectations. Interestingly, Table 3 shows that the significance of the G6 inflation gap is robust to the inclusion of other measures of external inflationary pressure. Possibly, this is due to the presence of a global (common) component in the inflation process in OECD countries, at least when long-samples are investigated (Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) , Mumtaz and Surico (2006) ). Notice that in performing our econometric analysis we do take the monetary policy stance into account. Somewhat surprisingly, the average real interest rate gap never turns out to be significant.
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3 Parameter (in)stability and the role of monetary policy
Instability issue
Our full sample results point towards the role possibly played by global inflation in influencing inflation expectations. By contrast, the monetary policy conduct appears to have exerted a negligible impact. Taken at their face value, our full-sample estimates support the idea that G6 inflation has played a key-rule in shaping U.S. inflation, a finding supporting the globalization hypothesis put forward by several observers. However, these results rely on the assumption of stability of the estimated relationships over time. In fact, it turns out that this assumption is not warranted, and a much richer story may be told when inspecting the time-variability of the relationships at stake.
To do so, we engage in the following exercise. We consider model (1) with e x t−1 = g π G t−1 , and we estimate it over different (rolling) windows.
19 Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the estimated parameters over the sample at hand. It is immediate to notice that the relevance of the U.S. output gap is not stable over the different subsamples we consider. Even more interestingly, the full-sample based finding regarding the relevance of global inflation is not supported by our rolling-window regressions. In fact, we observe a fall in global inflation's statistical relevance when approaching the second half of the sample. This is an interesting result, because it goes against the "globalization hypothesis" put forward by some observers, which actually tends to suggest a larger relevance of global aggregates in the last two decades. In this respect, Figure 4 reveals that the regressor that gains statistical relevance when during the '80s and '90s is the proxy of the Fed's monetary policy stance. Indeed, the first windows confirm the insignificance of the real interest rate gap in the estimated model, but the real interest rate clearly emerges as more recent observations are taken into account. Our subsample regressions do not offer an exact dating of the break occurring in the relationships existing between global inflation and inflation expectations on the one hand, and monetary policy conduct and inflation expectations on the other. Nevertheless, they call for a link with the literature supporting the hypothesis of a switch from "passive" to "active" monetary policy occurred in the U.S. in the early '80s (Clarida et al (2000) , Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) , Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Belaygorod and Dueker (2007) ). We then re-estimate the model with global inflation and the average real interest rate by concentrating on two different subsamples, i.e. 1970Q1-1982Q3 and 1982Q4-2006Q3 . The break date aims at capturing the change in the monetary policy that took place in the U.S. after the end of the Volcker experiment.
20 A standard Chow-breakpoint test supports our choice of the break-date: the null of parameter instability is clearly rejected (p-value: 0.02). Table 4 collects our subsample estimates, which confirm that the significance of global inflation weakens in the second part of the sample. The opposite holds as far as the monetary policy stance is concerned. 21 This result squares with the findings recently proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) , who estimate a Factor-Augmented VAR on a large set of U.S. and international macroeconomic series and find no support for global forces as elements affecting the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the sample 1984-1999. This evidence does not appear to be due to an endogeneity problem. In fact, GMM regressions (instruments: constant and four lags of inflation expectations gap, U.S. inflation gap, G6 inflation gap, monetary policy stance indicator gap) implies point estimates in line with those obtained with OLS. Table 5 shows our GMM-based 20 Some researchers point towards 1984Q4 as a break date for explaining the change in the dynamics of the inflation process in the United States and other countries (e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Borio and Filardo (2006) ). Our results are robust to setting to break-date to 1984Q4. 21 It is worth noticing that the correlation between global inflation and the real interest rate (both in gaps) is 0.46 in the sample 1970Q1-1984Q4, 0.44 in the next 10 years, and -0.10 in the sample 1995Q1-2006Q3. This confirms that while in the first part of the sample the information coming from global inflation renders that stemming from the monetary policy stance superfluous, things change in the second part of the sample. For similar findings, see Boivin and Giannoni (2007) . results, along with the p-values of the J-test confirming the goodness of the selected instruments.
The role of trade openness and global factors At a first glance, one may find as counterintuitive the vanishing role of global indicators: after all, the level of the U.S. trade openness has increased in the last two decades. However, when referring to inflation expectations -which is a measure capturing the expected growth rate of the price level -it is of interest to look at the increase of the trade openness (Ball (2006) ). In fact, the mean growth rate of the U.S. trade openness in the first subsample is 4.22%, while in the second subsample is 1.92%, a markedly lower value. Figure 5 offers a richer representation of the long-run evolution of the U.S. trade openness. Evidently, the acceleration of the U.S. trade exchanges took place in the '70s, then fell at the end of that decade, partly recovered in the '80s and '90s, and fell once more at the end of the last century, eventually upsurging since the beginning of the current decade. If trade openness had been one of the main drivers of the reduction in mean and variance of inflation and inflation expectations experienced in the U.S. in the last two decades, we should have probably observed a different pattern of its growth rate.
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These results are at odds with those proposed by Borio and Filardo (2006) . They estimate Phillips curves for 16 OECD countries in the sample 1985-2005 and find that global output gap measures overwhelm domestic output gaps in affecting domestic inflation. We offer two explanations for justifying the different results we find. First, we deal with a different object, i.e. inflation expectations (as opposed to realized inflation). Second, we consider the lagged dependent variable among the regressors. In fact, if we omit lagged inflation expectations when estimating eq. (1) (with e x t−1 =âvgrrate t−1 ) for the sample 1985Q1-2006Q3, we find a point estimate of 0.14 for the measure of global slack, significant at a 95% level. However, the model is clearly misspecified: the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test (run with 2 lags) rejects the null of independent residuals at the 99% level. When adding lagged inflation expectations, the point estimate of the global slack regressor lowers to 0.06, and it is not significant anymore at standard confidence levels.
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As already commented, we find support for global indicators in the pre-mid '80s subsample. This result may appear to be at odds with the one proposed by Ihrig et al 22 Further comments along this line can be found in Ball (2006) . 23 The statistical relevance of the global slack in Phillips curves seems to depend on the way a researcher builds up the measure of global pressure (see Ihrig et al (2007) for a detailed discussion).
(2007), who find no evidence for international demand pressures in Phillips curves estimated over the sample . Apart from the different objects under investigation (realized inflation in Ihrig et al (2007) as opposed to expected inflation in this paper), subsample selection appears to be the reason underlying our contrasting results. As already pointed out, when estimating equation (1) (2007)), the p-value of the global slack regressor raises from 0.05 up to 0.12, i.e. the global gap is not significant at standard confidence levels anymore.
Robustness checks
We checked the robustness of our results along several dimensions. We estimated models with additional lags of the dependent variable (second and fourth lag) to check if the significance of our measures of global inflation and monetary policy stance is driven by model misspecification. Moreover, we employed an alternative measure of G6 output gap constructed as a weighted average of the country-specific gaps (the weights being the shares of each country's real GDP on the G6 overall real GDP). We then detrended the variables of interest with an alternative filter (a one-sided backward looking MA(3)). We also considered undetrended measures of inflation. All these checks (not shown in the paper for the sake of brevity, but available upon request) confirmed the robustness of our findings.
An interpretation of our results
Our evidence supports the idea of a "substitution" between global inflation and the U.S. monetary policy stance as one of the determinants of U.S. inflation expectations at the end of the Volcker experiment. We propose the following monetary policy-related interpretation for our results. Forecasters exploit available information to predict the evolution of the object of interest. During the '70s, a big oil shock severely hit the U.S. economy. The reaction of the Fed was de facto inflationary, with the real interest rate recording also negative realizations in several quarters. In fact, the '70s were featured by high levels of inflation and inflation volatility. Given the weak link existing between real interest rates and inflation, forecasters might have looked at international indicators (other than those related to domestic variables) to refine their forecasts. High inflation in the G6 might have influenced the forecasters both because of the transmission of inflation via tradeables, and via the observed comovements in the inflation rates at an international level. 24 With the end of the Volcker-experiment, the Fed became more aggressive against inflation fluctuations and its credibility increased. 25 This is possibly one of the reasons why forecasters might have raised their attention on the U.S. monetary policy conduct. Interestingly, Ihrig et al (2007) find that the link between international economic conditions and domestic inflation in 11 industrialized countries is tenuous at best, and attribute this "missing link" to the improved monetary policy in the countries at stake. Ihrig et al (2007) argue that a better monetary policy might have anchored inflation expectations and stabilized inflation, so rendering it less sensitive to resource utilization and relative prices and potentially offsetting the impact of globalization.
Conclusions
This paper estimates several different reduced form models for tracking the U.S. inflation expectations. We considered both domestic macroeconomic drivers and potentially relevant global drivers such as global inflation or the global business cycle. We engaged both in full sample analysis and in rolling-window based investigations to assess the role played by global inflation and the Fed's monetary policy in influencing U.S. inflation expectations.
Our main findings point towards the instability of the estimated parameters of our empirical models. In particular, global indicators appear to have played a significant role until the mid-'80s, but they have subsequently been "replaced" by the U.S. monetary policy stance as one of the main drivers of U.S. inflation expectations. Our interpretation of this finding points towards the enhanced credibility that the Fed began to gain after the end of the Volcker experiment.
In a recent paper, Borio and Filardo (2006) propose to move from standard "domesticcentric" models to a novel "global-centric" paradigm acknowledging the role potentially played by global indicators in shaping a country's inflation rate. We agree with Borio and Filardo (2006) on the importance of carefully monitoring the evolution of the im- 24 We recall the already cited contributions by Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) and Mumtaz and Surico (2006) regarding the comovements in the inflation rates in the OECD. 25 Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) build up a framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules featured by different degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion are special cases of what they call "quasi (i.e. imperfect) commitment" regime. In short, each period a central bank formulates optimal commitment plans, but it faces an exogenous probability of reneging its promises. This probability is interpreted as a measure of lack of credibility. Hakan Kara (2007) estimates this credibility parameter, and finds evidence in favor of an increase of the Fed's credibility when moving over the Volcker regime.
pact that external pressures may exert on the domestic inflation process. However, our results suggest that U.S. inflation expectations have mainly been driven by domestic factors in a period in which the Fed has been aggressive enough to tackle the effects of macroeconomic shocks. Even if globalization is a fact, our evidence still supports the employment of "domestic-centric" models for policy analysis, a view recently proposed by Governor Donald L. Kohn (2006) and theoretically supported by Woodford (2007) .
Data appendix
The sources and the treatment of the data employed in this paper are the followings:
1-quarter ahead inflation forecasts: quarter-by-quarter (annualized) GDP inflation forecasts (median values) taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Note: During the '70s and the '80s, the Survey of Professional Forecasters was formulated in terms of GNP price deflator. However, over this period, the one-quarter annualized inflation rate computed using the GNP price deflator is extremely close to the one obtained with the GDP price deflator.
OECD U.S. output gap: Computed by the OECD as the percentualized log-deviation of the U.S. log real GDP (volume, base year: 2000) with respect to a measure of potential output. Potential output is based on a production function approach, taking into account the capital stock, changes in labour supply, factor productivities and underlying "non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment" (Nairu) for each Member country.
G6 output gap: Simple average of the OECD output gaps of Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom.
U.S. inflation rate: quarter-by-quarter (annualized) changes of the U.S. GDP deflator at market prices (base year: 2000) , taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
G6 inflation rate: Simple average of the OECD GDP deflator inflation rates of Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom.
U.S. import price inflation rate: quarter-by-quarter (annualized) changes of the import price index (base year: 2000), taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
U G7 money growth rate: Simple average of the growth rates of the money stock in the G7 countries. For the exact definition of the money stocks employed, see D'Agostino and Surico (2007) .
All the series employed in this paper are seasonally adjusted where applicable. All the gaps employed in this paper are computed as deviations (or log-deviations) of a given variable from its Hodrick-Prescott filter (weight: 1,600) where not differently specified. German data regard the sample 1991Q1-2006Q3 to remove the effect of reunification. 1970Q1 1974Q4 1979Q4 1984Q4 1989Q4 1994Q4 1999Q4 2004Q4 - 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Figure 5: TRADE OPENNESS GROWTH RATE: LONG-RUN TREND. Trend: Hodrick-Prescott filter (weight: 1.600) of the annualized quarterly growth rate of the U.S. trade openness. Trade openness computed as (Exports plus Imports)/GPD, as in Romer (1993) .
